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Why Working Capital Has Become a Supply-Chain Resilience Issue

For several decades, supply-chain management was dominated by the pursuit of efficiency.

Companies reduced inventories, consolidated suppliers, outsourced activities that others could perform more cheaply and built increasingly sophisticated just-in-time operating models. Finance departments pursued a parallel objective: reduce capital tied up in operations, accelerate receivables and extend payment terms wherever commercially possible.

There was sound logic behind both approaches. Capital has a cost, inventory can become obsolete, excess capacity is expensive and paying suppliers earlier than necessary reduces the cash available elsewhere in the business. Measures such as Days Inventory Outstanding, Days Sales Outstanding and Days Payable Outstanding therefore became standard components of corporate performance management. The difficulty is that optimising one company does not necessarily optimise the system in which that company operates.

A buyer that extends payment terms from 30 to 60 or 90 days improves its own working-capital position because it retains cash for longer. The underlying economic activity, however, has not changed. The supplier still has to purchase raw materials, employ people, finance production, pay energy and transport costs and fulfil the order. Extending the payment term does not remove that financing requirement. It moves it.

This distinction has become more important as companies have reconsidered the meaning of supply-chain resilience. The disruptions of the past several years have shown that highly efficient systems can also be surprisingly fragile. Pandemic shutdowns, shortages of critical components, congestion in global logistics networks, war in Ukraine, energy-market disruption and interruptions to major shipping routes have all demonstrated how problems in one part of a supply chain can propagate rapidly through the rest of it.

Companies responded by reconsidering sourcing concentration, strategic inventories, geographical exposure, logistics redundancy and supplier dependency. Yet one important part of the supply chain still receives less attention than it deserves: the financial resilience of the suppliers themselves.

Every physical supply chain is also a financial supply chain

Goods and services normally move in one direction through a supply chain, while money eventually moves in the opposite direction. The two flows, however, operate on very different timescales.

A supplier may purchase materials today, employ people for several weeks, manufacture a component, transport it to a customer and issue an invoice after delivery. The buyer may then pay that invoice 60 or 90 days later. During the entire period between the supplier's initial expenditure and eventual receipt of payment, somebody has to finance the gap.

Traditionally, a significant part of that burden has fallen on the supplier. The supplier may use retained earnings, an overdraft, bank credit, factoring or some other form of working-capital finance. Where those sources are expensive or constrained, the company may instead reduce inventory, postpone investment, slow recruitment or turn down new orders.

From the buyer's perspective, none of this may be immediately visible. The buyer sees a supplier that continues to deliver according to contract. Yet underneath the commercial relationship, the supplier may gradually be becoming financially weaker.

The original working-capital improvement has therefore created a different kind of risk.

Buyer actionImmediate buyer benefitPossible supplier consequencePossible supply-chain consequence
Extend payment termsHigher DPO and more cash retainedLarger working-capital requirementGreater financial vulnerability
Reduce inventoriesLess capital tied upLess buffer against demand changesHigher sensitivity to disruption
Consolidate suppliersPurchasing scale and lower administrative costGreater dependence on fewer firmsHigher concentration risk
Push prices lowerLower procurement costLower supplier marginsLess capacity to invest or absorb shocks
Increase order volumes rapidlyGreater buyer growthSupplier must finance expansionLiquidity can become the growth constraint

None of these actions is inherently wrong. The strategic question is whether their effects are being evaluated across the whole system, rather than only within the buyer's individual financial statements.

From efficiency to resilience

For many years, supply-chain excellence was closely associated with removing apparent inefficiency. Spare capacity looked wasteful. Multiple suppliers looked unnecessarily complex. Large inventories looked financially undisciplined. Long-term relationships could sometimes appear less attractive than continuous price competition.

The operating environment of the 2020s has forced companies to reconsider some of those assumptions. Resilience does not mean abandoning efficiency. It means recognising that a system designed only for ideal conditions may perform poorly when conditions cease to be ideal.

Companies now routinely examine issues such as dual sourcing, geographic diversification, strategic inventory, alternative logistics routes and the ability of critical suppliers to increase capacity quickly. Financial strength belongs in the same discussion. A critical supplier that lacks sufficient liquidity can become just as serious an operational vulnerability as a single-source factory or an overstretched logistics route. That is why working capital is moving beyond the treasury department.

Financial resilience should become part of supplier management

Procurement teams have traditionally evaluated suppliers according to criteria such as price, product quality, technical competence, delivery performance, capacity, sustainability and strategic importance. Financial health is often reviewed as part of supplier due diligence, but it is not always managed as actively as the other dimensions. That deserves to change.

A strategically important supplier can have excellent technology, outstanding people and a strong order book while still suffering from severe liquidity constraints. In fact, growth can make the problem worse.

Imagine a supplier whose sales are increasing rapidly. Each new order requires additional material purchases, labour, transport and production capacity. Revenue is recognised when the goods are sold, but cash may not arrive for another two or three months. The faster the business grows, the more money it has tied up in receivables. Profitability and liquidity are therefore not the same thing. A profitable supplier can fail because it runs out of cash.

For the buyer, that is not merely the supplier's problem. If the supplier produces a critical component, its financial weakness can become a production problem, a quality problem, a logistics problem or ultimately a customer-service problem.

The limits of maximising DPO

Days Payable Outstanding is a useful financial measure. Everything else being equal, a company that can retain its cash for longer improves its own liquidity. The difficulty lies in the phrase “everything else being equal”. Everything else is rarely equal.

If extending DPO forces suppliers to borrow at substantially higher interest rates, part of that cost may eventually return to the buyer through higher prices. If suppliers reduce inventory because cash is constrained, delivery reliability may deteriorate. If they postpone investment, the buyer may later discover that strategic suppliers lack the capacity to support its growth.

The apparent optimisation can therefore become a transfer of cost and risk rather than a genuine reduction in either. This is a classic systems problem. An individual component can be optimised in a way that reduces the performance of the system as a whole.

The same insight is already widely accepted elsewhere in supply-chain management. A company would not necessarily choose the cheapest possible shipping route if doing so created unacceptable lead-time risk. Nor would it necessarily select a single supplier simply because concentrating purchasing volumes produced a slightly lower unit cost. Working capital should increasingly be treated in the same way.

The relevant question is not simply:

How far can we extend payment terms?

It is:

What payment and financing structure produces the best overall combination of buyer liquidity, supplier resilience, cost and operational security?

That is a much more strategic question.

The apparent conflict between buyer and supplier

Traditional payment-term negotiations are often framed as a zero-sum problem. The buyer wants to pay later because doing so improves its cash position. The supplier wants to be paid earlier because doing so improves its cash position. If those are the only two alternatives, one party's improvement appears to require the other's deterioration.

A 60-day invoice illustrates the tension clearly. The buyer would prefer to keep the cash until day 60. The supplier may need the cash on day 5 to purchase material for its next order. Shortening the contractual term benefits the supplier but reduces the buyer's DPO. Keeping the term unchanged protects the buyer but leaves the supplier financing the gap.

There is, however, a third possibility. The contractual payment date and the supplier's liquidity date do not necessarily have to be the same. This is where supply-chain finance becomes strategically interesting.

Separating the liquidity date from the payment date

Once a supplier has delivered and an invoice has been approved, the nature of the transaction changes. Before approval, uncertainty may remain over delivery, quantity, quality, documentation or the amount payable. After approval, much of that commercial uncertainty has been resolved. The buyer has effectively confirmed that an amount is due on an agreed future date. That approved invoice can therefore potentially become a financing asset.

A finance provider can provide liquidity to the supplier before the contractual due date while the buyer continues to settle according to the original payment terms. The supplier can receive cash earlier without forcing the buyer to abandon its working-capital objectives.

The structure changes the apparent zero-sum relationship:

Traditional approachSupply-chain-finance approach
Buyer pays laterBuyer can still pay later
Supplier receives laterSupplier can receive earlier
Supplier finances the timing gapExternal capital finances the timing gap
Payment-term negotiation is zero-sumLiquidity and settlement dates can be separated
Working capital is optimised company by companyWorking capital can be optimised across the relationship

This does not mean that every supplier should finance every invoice. A supplier with abundant cash may simply wait until maturity. Another supplier may prefer earlier liquidity during periods of rapid growth. A third might accelerate only certain invoices when an attractive investment opportunity arises. The important change is choice. Instead of a fixed payment term dictating both when the buyer pays and when the supplier receives usable liquidity, the two events can increasingly be separated.

The value of the approved invoice

Digitalisation makes this approach much more practical than it was in the past. Modern procurement and ERP systems increasingly know whether goods have been ordered, whether delivery has occurred, whether an invoice has been submitted, whether it matches the purchase order and whether the buyer has approved it. That information has financial value because an unverified invoice and an approved invoice represent different risk situations. Once the buyer has confirmed the obligation, financing can increasingly be linked to the quality of the receivable and the buyer's ability to pay rather than relying exclusively on the standalone creditworthiness of the supplier.

This can be especially important where there is a large difference between the financial strength of the buyer and supplier. A small engineering company may face relatively high borrowing costs if assessed solely on its own balance sheet. Yet an approved invoice owed by a major multinational company represents a claim on an entirely different credit profile.

Supply-chain finance can therefore allow some of the financial strength of the anchor buyer to flow backwards through the supply chain. That is strategically important because the financial benefits of scale do not otherwise travel easily.

Large corporations normally have cheaper access to capital than their smaller suppliers. Yet those smaller companies may perform activities that are essential to the larger corporation's operations. Without an appropriate financing structure, the most financially vulnerable part of the supply chain may therefore also be one of its most operationally important parts.

Working capital as infrastructure

There is a useful parallel with logistics. No sophisticated manufacturing company would assume that goods will somehow move from the factory to the customer without deliberate logistics infrastructure. Warehousing, transportation, tracking, routing and contingency arrangements are consciously designed because the physical movement of goods is essential to the functioning of the supply chain.

Liquidity deserves increasingly similar treatment. A modern supply chain needs not only physical infrastructure but also financial infrastructure capable of moving capital to the companies that require it at the point where it creates most value.

The commercial transaction, the invoice, the buyer's approval, the contractual payment date and the financing of the intervening period can therefore be understood as parts of the same operating architecture.

This represents a significant change in thinking. Working-capital finance stops being something that happens separately between the supplier and its bank after the commercial terms have already been established. Instead, liquidity becomes something that can be designed into the commercial ecosystem itself.

Resilience without inefficiency

There is an important caution in all of this. Resilience should not become an excuse for poor financial discipline. Companies do not need unnecessarily large inventories, excessive cash reserves or expensive redundancy everywhere. Nor should buyers automatically abandon commercially appropriate payment terms merely because suppliers prefer to receive money sooner. The objective is more sophisticated: optimise the system rather than maximise one metric.

For some suppliers, ordinary payment terms will present no problem. For others, especially strategically important smaller suppliers, limited access to working capital may represent a genuine resilience risk. Those are the situations where buyer-led financing can be particularly valuable.

This means companies can begin to think about working capital in much the same way that they think about other resilience measures: selectively. A company does not need three suppliers for every paperclip. It may, however, need alternative sources for a component capable of stopping an entire factory. Similarly, a company does not need to subsidise the working capital of every supplier. It may nevertheless have a strong strategic interest in ensuring that critical suppliers can access liquidity efficiently. The question becomes one of segmentation.

Which suppliers are critical? Which are financially vulnerable? Which operate in sectors with long production cycles? Which need to invest in capacity? Which would benefit materially from access to financing based on the buyer's stronger credit quality? That analysis can transform supply-chain finance from a generic financial product into a targeted resilience instrument.

From supplier finance to supplier development

The implications extend beyond preventing failure. Suppliers with predictable access to liquidity may be better able to accept larger orders, invest in machinery, hire additional staff, build inventory buffers and support the buyer's expansion into new markets. Working-capital finance can therefore become part of supplier development.

This is an important distinction. The purpose is not simply to rescue weak companies. In many cases the most interesting candidates are successful suppliers whose growth itself creates working-capital pressure.

A supplier may have strong demand, attractive margins and excellent customers yet still struggle to finance a rapidly expanding receivables book. Earlier access to liquidity can allow such a company to grow without constantly expanding traditional borrowing facilities. The buyer benefits when suppliers can grow alongside it. That begins to transform the relationship from one based predominantly on price negotiation into one based on the performance of the wider commercial ecosystem.

The strategic working-capital company

The broader lesson reflects a shift occurring across corporate strategy. Companies once tended to optimise functions independently. Procurement optimised purchasing. Treasury optimised cash. Operations optimised production. Logistics optimised transportation. Increasingly, competitive performance depends on how those functions interact.

A procurement decision can have financial consequences. A financial decision can affect supplier behaviour. Supplier behaviour can influence operational resilience. Operational resilience can ultimately determine whether the company can serve its customers.

The strongest working-capital strategy may therefore not be the one that maximises the buyer's cash position at every possible moment. It may be the one that creates the best combination of capital efficiency, supplier strength, flexibility and operational resilience across the system. That is why an approved invoice should not be seen merely as an administrative document waiting for a future payment date. It represents economic value that has already been created, delivered and accepted.

The strategic question is whether that value should remain financially dormant for another 30, 60 or 90 days.

Where Smyrna fits

This is the problem Smyrna addresses with FastPay. By connecting approved invoices with financing, suppliers can gain access to liquidity earlier while buyers retain their agreed payment terms. The objective is not to undermine disciplined working-capital management. It is to make that management more sophisticated by recognising that the buyer's payment date and the supplier's liquidity date do not have to be identical.

For buyers, this provides a way to support supplier financial strength without simply shortening payment terms across the board. For suppliers, it can provide greater control over liquidity without relying exclusively on traditional bank financing. The larger opportunity is strategic.

Companies have spent the past several years redesigning physical supply chains to become more resilient. They have diversified suppliers, reviewed inventories, reassessed geographical dependencies and built greater operational flexibility. The financial supply chain deserves the same attention. A resilient supply chain requires financially resilient suppliers.